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Plea Bargains: Justice for the Wealthy and
Fear for the Innocent
Emily J. Stauffer1
18-year-old George Alvarez faced an impossible choice. He had
spent the last 6 months in jail awaiting trial for burglary. While in
jail, a guard accused Alvarez of attacking him. If Alvarez was found
guilty of assaulting the police officer, he would receive a minimum
of ten years in prison. Alvarez knew the guard was lying; the guard
had jumped him. However, spending ten years in prison was too
high a risk to take. Alvarez pled guilty to assaulting the officer in
exchange for a lesser sentence. He spent four years in prison before
security camera footage exonerated Alvarez. This footage had been
there all along; the prosecutor had the video proof of his innocence
before Alvarez pled guilty to the crime. Furthermore, when Alvarez later sued for compensation for his time incarcerated, a United
States Court of Appeals judge dismissed the lawsuit on the basis that
Alvarez had pled guilty, so the state could not be held liable for withholding the video.2
The situation is not much better for people with limited resources
who choose to assert their innocence. Kalief Browder was 16 years
old when he was arrested for stealing a backpack. Browder knew he
was innocent and refused to plead guilty. Despite his innocence, he
1
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like to express his gratitude for her editor Pavel Bermudez for all his
incredible work on this paper.
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See Somil Trivedi, This impossible choice we call plea bargaining, St.
Louis Am., (Jan. 24, 2020), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/
guest_columnists/this-impossible-choice-we-call-plea-bargaining/article_
ab959a96-3d5f-11ea-98ca-334757e00b92.html.
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spent three years behind bars awaiting a trial (which is much longer
than the sentence he probably would have received for stealing a
backpack). Browder spent almost two years in solitary confinement
and attempted suicide several times. After three years of enduring
the grueling incarceration, Browder was released from his pretrial
detention. After his release from jail, video footage surfaced of officers and large groups of inmates assaulting him. Browder also told
stories of being starved by guards. Outside of jail, he finished his
GED and began community college; however, his time in jail – especially his time in solitary confinement – was a wound too deep to
heal. Kalief Browder committed suicide shortly after being released.
Kalief often asserted that his time in jail, which eventually led to his
death, was a punishment for his assertion of innocence rather than
pleading guilty to a crime that he did not commit.3
Courts do not have the capacity to give every defendant a trial by
jury, so courts rely heavily on plea bargaining because it is a quick
way to get through the extreme volume of cases.4 Although the criminal justice system is a hotly debated topic, the overbooked nature of
the criminal justice system is backed by evidence and is relatively
uncontested. Only five percent of the world’s population lives in the
United States, but twenty-five percent of the world’s prison population lives in United States prisons.5 Furthermore, United States residents have a higher chance of being incarcerated than residents of
any other country with one in every 136 United States residents

3

See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before The Law, The New Yorker, (Sept. 29,
2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-thelaw; See also Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993-2015, The New
Yorker, (June 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/
kalief-browder-1993-2015.

4

E.g., Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining Research Summary,
(Jan. 24, 2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/
document/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf, (Scholars estimate that
about 90-95 percent of cases are disposed of through plea bargaining).

5

ACLU, Mass Incarceration, (last visited Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.aclu.
org/issues/smart-justice/mass-incarceration.

Plea Bargains: Justice for the Wealthy and Fear for the Innocent

169

being incarcerated.6 Due to the sheer number of Americans going
to prison, the United States criminal justice system does not have
the resources to grant every defendant a trial by jury. As a result,
the system relies heavily on plea deals to process cases efficiently.7
In 2018, only 2 percent of defendants in federal criminal cases went
to trial and an overwhelming 90 percent of defendants pled guilty
before trial.8 Moreover, 97 percent of current United States prisoners
have taken plea bargains.9 Due to its widespread impact, plea bargaining is at the very center of the American criminal justice system.
As Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy said, “plea bargaining
. . . is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” 10
Unlike trials, where constitutional law and case law strictly outline the process, the plea bargaining process is much more flexible.
The structure of plea bargaining gives prosecutors wide discretion
over the outcome of a case. One of the most effective techniques
prosecutors use is pretrial detention. More than half a million people
incarcerated in the United States, like Kalief Browder, have never
been convicted of a crime.11 About 65 percent of people in jail and
24 percent of people incarcerated at the state and local levels are in
6

See BBC News, World Prison Populations, (last visited Feb. 1, 2021),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm,
(stating that 737 people out of every 100,000 are incarcerated).

7

See John F. Padgett, Plea Bargaining and Prohibition in the Federal
Courts, 1908-1934, 24, L. & Soc’y Rev. 413, 419-423 (1990) (showing
empirical evidence of the effect caseloads have on public defenders).

8

John Gramlich, Only 2% of federal criminal defendants go to trial, and
most who do are found guilty, (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-totrial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/.

9

Innocence Project, Report: Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on
the Decline, (Aug. 7, 2018), https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-onthe-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline.

10

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012).

11

Jacob Goldin, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial
Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from
Randomly Assigned Judges, 108, Am. Econ. Rev., 201, 201, (Feb. 2018).
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pretrial detention and have not yet been convicted.12 Many of these
people are in pretrial detention simply because they cannot afford
bail. When defendants are in pretrial detention, they cannot go to
work, go home, or see their family. Therefore, people in pretrial
detention get more pressure to plead guilty, so that they can get out
of jail.
Another tactic that prosecutors can use to convince defendants
to accept plea deals is using the trial penalty to their advantage. The
trial penalty is the idea that those who accept plea bargains get less
severe sentences than those who go to trial. As in the case of George
Alvarez, defendants may plead guilty in fear of getting a more severe
sentence at trial.
America’s criminal justice system cannot exist without plea
deals, but the plea-bargaining process protects the prosecutors’
discretion rather than individuals’ rights. Because of this, courts
convict defendants because they are too poor to assert their constitutional right to go to trial. Although the direct costs of a trial can be
covered by the state, many indirect costs keep people from going to
trial and instead force them to take plea deals. These indirect costs
include pretrial detention, the trial penalty, and the costs of a trial.
Additionally, people who live in poverty are disadvantaged in the
plea-bargaining process because of poor representation and psychological factors.
Supreme Court precedence requires that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the poor must have equal access to the criminal justice system.13 If poverty restricts a person from a part of the justice
system, states must remedy that flaw. Although the historical court
rulings have left states to decide how to remedy such unequal access,
I suggest several remedies. Under these proposals, state reforms will
12

Patrick Liu, Ryan Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, The Economics of Bail and
Pretrial Detention, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/
papers/the_economics_of_bail_and_pretrial_detention.

13

See e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1986) (stating “Such a denial
is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and
special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has”).
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create a more equal justice system and will restore equal protection
under the constitution.
Part I explains the lack of regulation in the plea-bargaining
process and how, because of the unregulated structure of the pleabargaining process, prosecutors and defendants are not on a level
playing field. This section also lays out the relevant constitutional
principles. Part II sets out legal precedents and establishes general
rules to guide discussions of plea-bargaining’s relationship with the
constitution. Part III explains how both prosecutorial tactics and
flaws in the criminal justice system restrict the poor from full access
to the criminal justice system, specifically access to a trial. Part
IV reiterates the obligation that states have under the constitution
to resolve these issues. Part V suggests actions states can take to
resolve the constitutional issues.

I. Background
A. Waiving Rights
Plea bargaining is a contract between the state and the defendant
where the state agrees to lower the penalties and the defendant
agrees to waive their right to trial by jury, saving the court time and
resources and expediting the sentencing process.14
Despite the less extreme sentences that plea bargains usually
offer, plea bargains are not always the best option for defendants.
When defendants waive their right to a trial by jury, they also waive
other rights guaranteed to the accused, such as their privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to confront one’s accusers, the right to
plead “not guilty,” the right to require the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to compel favorable witnesses,

See Sara J. Berman, The Basics of a Plea Bargain, (last visited Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-basics-plea-bargain.
html#:~:text=A%20plea%20bargain%20is%20an,the%20judge%20a
%20specific%20sentence.

14
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and the right to present any available defenses at trial.15 Defendants
also lose the right to appeal any case because they were not given
these rights.16 In some cases, defendants waive their right to challenge issues related to pretrial rights, such as there being no probable
cause for arrest, improperly seized evidence, an illegally obtained
confession, and more.17 The court upheld these waivers of rights as
constitutional in Brady v. United States.18 Although plea bargains
help defendants get lesser punishments, the lesser punishments often
come at a high cost. These costs are especially high for defendants
who are innocent of the crime they were indicted for, as in the cases
of George Alverez and Kalief Browder.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
Additionally, when defendants enter the plea bargaining process,
they are subject to the prosecutor’s discretion. Plea bargains are handled at the prosecutor’s discretion in four ways. First, prosecutors
alone draft the bargains which judges can only approve or deny.19
In fact, in most cases, judges are prohibited from participating in or
commenting on the plea negotiations, leaving the sentencing power
almost entirely to the prosecutors.20 Second, unlike in other areas of
15

See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 Fordham L.
Rev. 2011, 2011 (2012); See also Lee Sheppard, Disclosure to the Guilty
Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J. of
Crim. L. and Criminology 165, 165 (1981). See also Plea Agreements
And Sentencing Appeal Waivers -- Discussion Of The Law, https://www.
justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-626-plea-agreementsand-sentencing-appeal-waivers-discussion-law (last visited Feb. 23,
2021).

16

See Plea Agreements And Sentencing Appeal Waivers -- Discussion Of
The Law, supra note 15.

17

See Alexandra W. Reimelt, Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 871, 873 (2010).

18

Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, (1969).

19

21 Am. Jur. 2d Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining Process § 619.

20

21 Am. Jur. 2d supra note 19.
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law, the plea bargaining process is rather unrestricted. Depending
on the state, prosecutors can present plea bargains before the trial,
during the trial, or even after the trial in cases where the jury cannot
decide.21 This gives prosecutors discretion to strategically propose
plea bargains when they are most likely to be accepted. Third, during the plea bargaining process, prosecutors can withhold evidence
favorable to the defendant. This evidence would otherwise come out
at trial.22 Fourth, legislation has increasingly given prosecutors several tools to push plea deals onto defendants. For example, defendants
can be forced into pretrial detention, which can pressure defendants
into taking unfavorable deals.23 Additionally, increased mandatory
minimum sentencing (a legal requirement for the minimum penalty

21

Berman, supra note 14.

22

See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (stating “We now
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution”); See also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633
(2002) (stating “lead us to conclude that the Constitution does not require
the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant”).

23

See, e.g., Bureau of Just. Assistance U.S. Dep’t. of Just., Plea and Charge
Bargaining: Research Summary (2011) (referring to Kellough and
Wortley’s findings when saying, “Pretrial detention has a strong effect on
the decision to offer and accept pleas. Those who are taken into custody
are more likely to accept a plea and are less likely to have their charges
dropped”); See also Gail Kellough and Scot Wortley, Remand for Plea:
Bail Decisions and Plea Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions, 42 The
Brit. J. of Criminology 186, 186 (2002) (“rather than ‘managing risk,’ the
findings showed that the detention of accused persons was an important
resource that the prosecution used to encourage or coerce guilty pleas
from accused persons.” “What is structured into this linkage between bail
and plea bargaining is not a reduction of the accused’s opportunities for
offending so much as a decrease in the ability of vulnerable groups to
resist the system’s power to punish”); See generally Pretrial Policy: State
Laws, https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrialpolicy-state-laws.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2021) (describing pretrial
detention laws by state).
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at trial) gives defendants even more reason to avoid trial.24 All four
forms of prosecutorial discretion put prosecutors at an advantage in
the plea bargaining process.
C. Plea Bargaining Precedent
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants a right to a trial by
jury, but this right can be waived in the plea bargaining process.25 The
Supreme Court has on numerous occasions upheld plea bargains.26
24

See U. S. Sent’g. Commission, Quick Facts on Mandatory Minimum Penalties (2015). (stating “In 2015 at sentencing, 13.5 percent of all offenders
in cases reported to the United States sentencing commission remained
subject to a mandatory minimum penalty”) (“The average sentence length
of offenders who remained subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at
sentencing was 138 months, over twice the average sentence of offenders
receiving relief from such a penalty (66 months). The average sentence
for offenders not convicted of any offense carrying a mandatory minimum
penalty was 28 months”); See generally Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines,
63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1851, 1851-52 (1994-1995) (describing the history of
mandatory minimum sentencing including related laws passed in the late
1900s).

25

See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating “Several
federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when
a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First is the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U. S. 1. Second is the right to trial by jury”).

26

See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 790 (1970) (stating “An
otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by a defendant’s
desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized
if there is a jury trial”); See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 25
(1970) (stating “A guilty plea that represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternatives available to a defendant, especially one
represented by competent counsel, is not compelled within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment because it was entered to avoid the possibility of the
death penalty.”); See also Brady, 397 U.S. at 742 (stating “A plea of guilty
is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of the death
penalty, and here, petitioner’s plea of guilty met the standard of voluntariness, as it was made “by one fully aware of the direct consequences” of
that plea”).
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However, courts have created guidelines for when defendants can
legally waive their right to trial. For example, in multiple cases, the
Supreme Court has held that confessions cannot be coerced or compelled.27 In Brady, the Court expected plea bargains to only be used
when there is overwhelming evidence that the defendant is guilty
and, therefore, a trial would waste time and resources.28 The Court
further suggested that plea negotiations should not be used when
evidence is uncertain.29

II. Rule
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that a state cannot “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law.” The following section analyzes Supreme
Court decisions where the defendant lived in poverty and the decisions were based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The following
analysis shows that when poverty impedes full access to the justice
system, the state is required to correct that imbalance.

27

Brady, 397 U.S. at 742.

28

Id. at 752 (stating “we take great precautions against unsound results,
and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or trial.
We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of
guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood
that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn
themselves. But our view is to the contrary, and is based on our expectation that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilt are voluntarily
and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of
counsel, and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability
of the defendants’ admissions that they committed the crimes with which
they are charged”).

29

Id. at 752 (stating “with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial doubt
that the State can sustain its burden of proof”); See also id. at 742 (stating
“That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care
and discernment has long been recognized”).
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In Griffin v. Illinois,30 two defendants, Griffin and Crenshaw,
were convicted of armed robbery. Immediately, the two wanted to
appeal their case but needed a transcript to do so. They filed a motion
asserting that they could not afford to pay the transcript fees. The
Supreme Court held that transcript fees violated the 14th Amendment.31 In the majority opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed that
the state could not discriminate on account of poverty and that to
deny the poor the right to appeal was no different than denying them
a trial.32 Griffin is the beginning of a series of rulings that all have
the same conclusion: poverty cannot impede access to the criminal justice system under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state must
compensate and provide the poor with equal footing so there is equal
protection under the law.
Eskridge v. Washington33 was similar to Griffin. Eskridge was
in prison and wanted to appeal his conviction. A transcript was
required to do so, but Eskridge could not afford it. Under Washington law, the state would only provide the appeal if a judge thought it
30

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1986).

31

See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (stating “Such a denial is a misfit in a country
dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none in
the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”).

32

See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (stating “Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Government could constitutionally provide that
defendants unable to pay court costs in advance should be denied the right
to plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court. Such a law would
make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless thing. Notice,
the right to be heard and the right to counsel would, under such circumstances, be meaningless promises to the poor. In criminal trials, a State can
no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race, or color. Plainly, the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, and could not be used as
an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial... There is no meaningful
distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend
themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an
adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay
the costs in advance”).

33

Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
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would promote the interests of justice. In this case, the court denied
Eskridge the requested transcript. With Griffin as precedence, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the denial of a transcript based on
poverty was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that destitute defendants must be given equally adequate appellate reviews
as those who can afford transcripts.
Likewise, in Smith v. Bennet the Supreme Court ruled that
the state of Iowa violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying
an indigent prisoner a writ of habeas corpus because he could not
afford to pay the associated fees.34 The Court stated that to impose
any financial consideration between a prisoner and their right to sue
is to deny equal protection of the law.35 They also reaffirmed Griffin’s decision that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”36 This
case extended the Griffin doctrine beyond appellate proceedings into
post-conviction proceedings.
In Lane v. Brown,37 a respondent was convicted and sentenced
to death. He tried appealing with the help of the public defender but
lost. Lane wanted to appeal his case again, but the public defender
thought they would be unsuccessful and stopped representing him.
Undeterred, Lane tried to continue appealing his case, but first, he
needed a transcript—which he could not afford. He appealed to
receive the transcript for free and for counsel to be appointed. The
Supreme Court of Indiana denied both requests. Under the law, the
only way for an indigent to receive the transcript was with the help
of a public defender. The Supreme Court ruled that denying Lane’s

34

Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961) (stating “In failing to extend
the privilege of the Great Writ to its indigent prisoners, Iowa denies them
equal protection of the laws”).

35

Smith, 365 U.S. at 709 (stating “We hold that to interpose any financial
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of
a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws”).

36

Smith, 365 U.S. at 710.

37

Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
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appellate review because of his poverty was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.38
That same year, the Supreme Court issued the Gideon v. Wainwright ruling.39 Gideon was charged with felony breaking and entering. At his trial, he requested a lawyer to represent him. Under Florida
law, attorneys were only appointed for capital cases, so Gideon had
to represent himself. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the
denial of representation violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Sixth Amendment.40
These cases show that when poverty becomes an impediment to
full access to the justice system, the impediment violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court recognizes the equal right
of all, rich or poor, in all stages of the legal process, from trial to
post-conviction. When poverty creates an imbalance, the state has
the responsibility to correct that imbalance and to ensure equal protection for all. The Court has left states to decide how best to correct
that imbalance.41 In the past, this has included paying for an attorney
or paying for a transcript; however, today, the unique combination
of the burden of indirect trial costs and the restraints of a broken
38

Id. at 478 (stating “We agree that the Indiana procedure at issue in this
case falls short of the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment”).

39

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).

40

See id. at 335 (stating “The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal
trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential to
a fair trial, and petitioner’s trial and conviction without the assistance of
counsel violated the Fourteenth Amendment”). See also id. at 348 (stating
“That the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in ‘all criminal prosecutions’ is clear, both from the language of the Amendment and
from this Court’s interpretation”).

41

See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20 (stating “The Illinois Supreme Court appears to
have broad power to promulgate rules of procedure and appellate practice.
We are confident that the State will provide corrective rules to meet the
problem which this case lays bare”). See also Lane, 372 U.S. at 483. See
also Eskridge, 357 U.S. at 216 (stating “We do not hold that a State must
furnish a transcript in every case involving an indigent defendant. But
here, as in the Griffin case, we do hold that “[d]estitute defendants must
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts”).
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criminal system forces the poor to plead guilty before trial. Poor
people do not have equal access to a trial—an essential part of the
criminal justice system—and states must correct this issue.

III. Poor People Do Not Have Equal Access to Trial
A. Indirect Costs
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants the right to a trial
by jury. However, poor defendants cannot afford the indirect costs of
trial and therefore must waive that right and plead guilty. The indirect costs of trials include pretrial detention, the trial penalty, and the
cost of court appearances. If poor defendants have no choice but to
waive their constitutional right to a trial by jury, this begs the question of whether they truly had this right to begin with.
i. Pretrial Detention
In 2017, 65 percent of the United States prison population, totaling
approximately 480,000 individuals, was held in detention awaiting
trial or court action.42 Pretrial detention forces defendants to miss
work, causing defendants to lose days, weeks, or even months of
income. In fact, in 2010, about 64 percent of defendants were detained
for the entirety of their case.43 This can lead to debt, lost housing,
family stress, and unemployment. 44 Although pretrial detention can
be stressful for anyone, it is especially stressful for poor defendants
for two reasons: (1) they cannot afford bail and, therefore are more
likely to be held in pretrial detention, and (2) they have fewer savings for family members to rely on while the defendant is away
from work.
42

Liu & Nunn, supra note 12.

43

Thomas H. Cohen, Pretrial Detention and Misconduct in Federal District
Courts, 1995-2010, (Feb. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pdmfdc9510.pdf.

44

See Mathieu R. Despard, Terri Friedline, & Stacia Martin-West, Why Do
Households Lack Emergency Savings? The Role of Financial Capability,
J. of Fam. & Econ. Issues, 1, 1, (2020).
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Data from the 2017 Survey of Household Economics and Decision Making shows that four in ten households would need to borrow
money, sell some of their assets, or would be unable to pay if faced
with a $400 emergency expense.45 However, bail is usually much
higher than $400. Researchers have found that 70 percent of felony
defendants have been assigned bail amounts greater than $5000,
with the average bail for felony defendants at $55,400.46 Currently,
over 90 percent of people in pretrial detention are eligible for bail but
have not posted it.47 Because people stay in pretrial detention when
they cannot afford to get out, the poor are more likely to be held in
pretrial detention.
Not only are poor defendants less likely to pay bail, but they
are also more likely to experience adverse financial consequences
of pretrial detention. Prosecutors know that defendants who do not
have savings and need to get out of jail to work and provide for their
families are more likely to plead guilty. As one prosecutor said,
“When you hold somebody’s freedom, you limit their ability to hold
a job [and] pay their bills [so] they will take the deal pretty much
no matter what.”48 In fact, pretrial detention is linked to a greater

45

See Board of Governors of The Fed. Res. Sys., Report on the Economic
Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017, (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201805.pdf (stating “When faced with a hypothetical expense of
only $400, 59 percent of adults in 2017 say they could easily cover it, using entirely cash, savings, or a credit card paid off at the next statement”).

46

Jacob Goldin, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial
Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from
Randomly Assigned Judges, 108, Am. Econ. Rev., 201, 201, (Feb. 2018).

Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 –
Statistical Tables, December 2013, https://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_
Topic-Areas/07-CM_Trends_Analysis/20160122/04_BJS_Repor
t_State_Felony_Sentencing_2009.pdf.
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likelihood of receiving harsher sentences.49 On the other hand, those
who have the financial stability to provide for their families while
not working do not have the same pressure to get out of detention
quickly through a guilty plea.
Evidence supports this claim. In a study of criminal cases in
Philadelphia, researchers found that defendants who were held in
pretrial detention were less likely to get their charges reduced in their
plea deals.50 Other researchers found that pretrial detention increases
the likelihood of conviction, whether at trial or through a plea, by
13 percent. On the other hand, defendants who were released from
pretrial detention were 14 percent less likely to be found guilty than
those who were not released.51 This disparity disproportionately
affects those who cannot afford bail and therefore have no choice
but to spend days, weeks, months, or years in pretrial detention.
Although pretrial detention pushes all detained defendants to plead
guilty, the poor are disproportionately affected, because they are
overrepresented in pretrial detention and have stronger incentives to
get out of detention.
ii. Trial Penalty
Research shows that people who go to trial often get more extreme
sentences than those who take plea deals.52 This concept is known as
the trial penalty. Prosecutors use the trial penalty to convince defendants to plead guilty rather than go to trial.
The trial penalty is especially intimidating for the poor. Consider the following hypothetical situation. A woman is arrested for
a crime she did not commit. Both the woman and her husband make
minimum wage, so after providing for their children they have no
savings. A prosecutor tells the woman that she can plead guilty to the
crime and spend three months in jail, or she can assert her innocence
49
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at trial and risk spending three years in jail. If this woman goes to
jail for three years, her family goes three years without her income
and her husband will have to balance being the sole financial provider for the family and the sole caretaker for their children. Logically, the less financially stable her family is the more likely it is that
the defendant will plead guilty to the crime and go to jail for three
months rather than put her family in such an unpredictable situation
for three years.
On the other hand, a defendant who has savings will surely not
want to be separated from their family while in prison, nonetheless,
they will have the assurance that their savings will provide for their
family while they are incarcerated. Therefore, the wealthy defendant
will feel less pressure to plead guilty and accept the less severe sentence. The trial penalty threatens the poor more than the non-poor
and pushes the poor into accepting plea bargains rather than going
to trial.
iii. Court Appearances
Third, if a person perseveres through the costs of pretrial detention
and discussion of the trial penalty, they must next face the indirect
costs of court appearances. The costs of court appearances are like
those of pretrial detention and the trial penalty. Trials can take several days, which means that not only do people need to find childcare
for those days, but they also must miss work. If people miss work
for that many days, they may lose their job. This situation is especially threatening for poor people who do not have savings to act as
a safety net while they are without work.
The costs of pretrial detention, the trial penalty, and court appearances all have similar effects on defendants. When poor defendants
are kept from providing for their families, they will make sacrifices
to return to work and to continue to earn money, even if this means
they take a bad deal or plead guilty to a crime they did not commit.
These indirect costs of trial disadvantage the poor by encouraging
defendants to plead guilty and discouraging defendants from going
to trial. This gives defendants unequal access to trial.
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B. Broken System
Beyond the indirect costs of trial, the poor also have unequal access
to trial because of flaws in the justice system. There are two flaws in
the justice system that keep poor defendants from going to trial: ineffective public defenders and the existence of extreme psychological
distress.
i. Public Defenders
In McCann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court reasoned that defense
counsel will keep defendants from being coerced into taking a plea
deal.53 However, this is not the case. Nationwide, public defenders
are so overbooked that they cannot dedicate the time necessary to
adequately represent their clients. In some states, the average workload for a public defender is over 365 cases a year. In Kentucky, it is
over 448 cases.54 In Kentucky, the average public defender, assuming they do not take a single day off work, is assigned 1.2 cases a
day. In Maryland, 380 public defenders have a workload of 530.55
Additionally, an American Bar Association study of the Missouri
State Public Defender System caseloads concluded that the number
of public defenders needed to be increased by 75 percent to provide
basic services.56 Even Colorado, which has the best-funded public
defense system in the nation, operates at a 10 percent staff deficit
in their public defense offices.57 Nationwide, public defenders are
overbooked.
Not only are public defenders overbooked, but they are often
underfunded. Recently, Louisiana cut public trial defense funding
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by 62 percent.58 In certain places in Louisiana, funding was so low
that judges had to appoint tax, family, real estate, and other attorneys
to criminal cases where defendants could not afford an attorney.59 In
Wisconsin, private attorneys who take on public defense cases are
paid only $40 an hour, much lower than they can make elsewhere.
As a result, fewer lawyers accept public defense cases.60 Additionally, in Florida, the average entry-level salary of a public defender is
$41,570.61 If a public defender supported four kids and was arrested,
that public defender would qualify to be represented by a public
defender.62
Although funding for public defense is sparse nationwide, poor
communities receive even less funding than wealthy communities.
In 13 states, counties must use their own money, rather than state
funding, to provide counsel for poor defendants.63 This means that in
lower-income counties, public defenders have even fewer resources.
In fact, in counties that fund their public defenders, 73 percent were
operating above the recommended caseload per attorney.64
Public defenders are overworked, underpaid, and even sometimes absent at crucial points in a case. When public defenders are
overworked, underpaid, and have minutes - rather than hours - to
spend on cases, they have an incentive to get through cases quickly.65 Defense attorneys often accept plea deals because it’s the easiest
58
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and quickest way to deal with their case, not because they are acting
in the best interest of their client.66 Alternatively, private attorneys
have fewer incentives to advise their clients to accept a plea bargain.
Compared to public defenders, private attorneys usually defend
fewer clients at a time and have a bigger incentive to build clientele
(because unlike public defenders, they are not assigned cases). To
build clientele, private attorneys may want to spend more time on
each case to get their client better outcomes and, therefore, to build a
reputation as a reliable attorney.
Private and public defense are anything but equal. When public
defenders do not have the time, resources, or (in some cases) the
incentives to advocate for their clients, those who cannot afford private representation are pushed out of trials and into plea negotiations. The underfunded state of the public defense system is more
than a simple inconvenience for the poor, it is a complete impairment
to their chances of success.
ii. People in Poverty are Less Likely to Take Risks
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that aggressive
techniques used by prosecutors in the plea bargaining process are
not coercive.67 Although extreme prosecutorial techniques, such as
pretrial detention and threatening the trial penalty, are not coercive
to the general population, the unique environment that poor people
live in makes it so these techniques are, in fact, coercive for the poor.
Psychological research shows that poverty affects people’s decision-making in high-stress environments. When people are stressed,
they get an increase in a hormone named cortisol.68 Sustained high
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levels of cortisol are closely linked to people who live in poverty.69
Cortisol is also linked with people who “stick to what they know”
rather than exploring new options.70 In fact, consistently high levels
of cortisol, as found in people who live in poverty, have been shown
to negatively affect decision-making strategies both in the moment
and over time.71
Researchers tested whether financial concerns affect creative
decision-making. They found that poor people, when asked to make
decisions after being asked about finances, were significantly less
likely to take risks and think creatively than their non-poor counterparts.72 Additionally, sleep deprivation, which has been proven to
be more common among poor people, has also been linked to poor
decision-making. People who regularly do not get enough sleep are
also more likely to “stick to what they know” rather than exploring
alternatives. 73
With the combination of stress, sleep deprivation, and other factors, various studies have shown that people who live in poverty are
more likely to rely on habit-based decisions rather than goal-directed
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decisions.74 Goal-directed decisions focus on the desired outcome
and choose the most likely way to achieve that outcome. On the other
hand, habit-based decision-makers do not consider options outside of
what they are comfortable with.75 This emphasizes that people who
live in poverty are less likely to take risks, even if the risks are small
and the most rational option available.
In the plea bargaining context, defendants are faced with many
decisions with consequences that could follow them for the rest of
their lives. Not only are these decisions important, but they are made
under extreme stress. As discussed before, due to pretrial detention,
the trial penalty, higher costs of trial, and inadequate representation,
poor people are under more stress than the average defendant. But
not only are poor people under more stress in the plea bargaining
process, but they are also less able to deal with that stress because
they are less likely to take risks, even if the risks are small and rational. For example, if a prosecutor explains the trial penalty and the
defendant is poor, they will be more likely than their non-poor counterparts to waive their right to trial.
Some might object, arguing that all of this, while unfortunate,
does not constitute a violation of the 14th Amendment. They might
say that some people are poor, and we are not expected to fix inherent inequalities in everyone. It might be conceded that any one of
these reasons alone would probably not be strong enough to count as
a violation of equal protection. However, when we take all of them
into account and see that they all single out a protected class, the
poor, we realize that there is an inequality in access to the criminal justice system. The poor get an overburdened public defender;
they get bails they cannot pay; they are held in jail to await their
trial (causing them to miss work which only exacerbates the problem),
and then, with the memories of jail fresh and worries about providing
74
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for their families at the top of their minds, they face a prosecutor
bent on getting a conviction. There is undeniable inequality in the
criminal justice system that the 14th Amendment was designed to
prevent. These issues are more than simply unfortunate problems for
the poor. They are an impediment to their promised equal treatment
under the law. These obstacles embody the very inequalities that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent.

IV. Application
The costs inherent in pretrial detention, trial penalties, and court
appearances in combination with flaws in the system – such as overburdened public defenders and the creation of inherent psychological
distress for defendants – keep poor defendants from going to trial.
This unequal access to trial violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has not only recognized a constitutional right
to a trial by jury but has also recognized on numerous occasions the
poor’s disadvantage in the criminal justice system. Historical precedence shows that when the poor have unequal access to the criminal
justice system, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated. Certainly,
the current state of the criminal justice system unjustly forces poor
defendants to accept plea bargains, keeping them from exercising
their right to trial by jury.
Some may contend that historical precedence has only been
applied to direct costs of a trial (such as transcript and attorney fees)
and does not apply to indirect costs (such as those mentioned in this
paper). This is simply not true. Although the Supreme Court has
never held that a specific indirect cost in the criminal justice system
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the scope of Court decisions
applies to any costs (direct or indirect) that deny access to a trial.
For example, in Smith v. Bennet, the Supreme Court reasoned
that “to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent
prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his
liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.”76
“Consideration” is broader than simply fines or costs. “Financial
76
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considerations” should include stress, burdens, and obligations.
Although financial considerations are an inherent and necessary
part of the criminal justice system, according to the Supreme Court,
financial considerations that are harsher on poor defendants than
non-poor defendants violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
the indirect costs of trial are within the scope of court precedence
and therefore are restricted by the Fourteenth Amendment.

V. Prescriptive Claim
The poor have a severe disadvantage in the court system. This disadvantage creates an impediment to full and equal access to the court
systems. As discussed in Section II, historical court rulings such as
those in Griffin v. Illinois, Eskridge v. Washington, Smith v. Bennet,
Lane v. Brown, and Gideon v. Wainwright hold that when a group of
people does not have equal access to the criminal justice system, the
court must resolve the inequality. The courts have let states decide
how to resolve the inequality. This section recommends solutions to
the unequal access to trials.
A. Reimbursement
Research suggests that the high indirect costs of trials, such as missing work, encourage defendants to plead guilty even if they are innocent. Therefore, if a person lives below the poverty line and is found
innocent at trial, states should reimburse that person for their time
away from work. To equalize the time taken away from work, states
should pay the defendant at least minimum wage in that state for
every hour, up to forty hours a week, that the defendant spent in
pretrial detention, the plea bargain negotiations, or court. States can
determine where these funds will come from. If innocent defendants
get reimbursed for their time in the justice system, it will subset the
costs of trial and encourage more innocent defendants to go to trial
even if they live below the poverty line.
An obvious critique of this method will be its perceived financial
burden on states. However, it may be the cheapest option for three
reasons. First, under this suggestion, the court will only need to pay

190

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 35, 2021

the defendant minimum wage. This is much cheaper than the alternative of paying the higher salary of a mediator or judge to mediate
the pre-trial process.
Second, the court will only have to reimburse defendants in a
select few cases. As mentioned above, an estimated 90 percent of
defendants plead guilty before trial, and in only a small fraction of
cases, defendants are found innocent at trial. Although the reimbursement method will ideally make it easier for people who live in
poverty to go to trial and be found innocent, the number of people
found innocent at trial will still be a small fraction of the total
number of criminal cases. Additionally, the state only needs to
reimburse defendants who live in poverty, narrowing the cost for
states even more.
Third, a reimbursement policy will strongly discourage prosecutors from wasting time and resources by pursuing weak cases. In
the current system, even if a case against the defendant is weak,
the defendant may plead guilty anyway. For example, in George
Alvarez’s case, the prosecutor knew that there was hidden evidence
that could exonerate Alvarez, but Alvarez still pled guilty. The government wasted tax-payer dollars for four years by locking up an
innocent man. Similarly, the government wasted money for three
years by keeping Kalief Browder in pre-trial detention before releasing him without a trial. If the government is forced to compensate
for keeping innocent Americans away from their work, family, and
homes, the state will minimize their losses by only pursuing cases
where there is a good chance of winning. When states only pursue strong cases, the justice system will be less overburdened, and
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders will have more time.
B. Accessible Loans
Another option is to provide easily accessible and low-interest loans
to people who live in poverty and are in pretrial detention, in the
plea bargaining system, or going through a trial. Because of fines,
attorney fees, and time away from work and home, many people who
enter the criminal justice system need money quickly. Currently,
people who cannot access quick money may feel like they have no
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choice but to plead guilty to get out of the system and return to work.
These loans are not meant to be used to post bail but are instead
meant to help defendants keep their life in order by paying bills,
buying groceries, getting childcare, and more. However, these loans
should not be predatory, meaning that they should not put people living in poverty in a worse situation. States should make these loans
either low-interest or government-subsidized. Accessible loans will
help defendants assert their innocence by minimizing the external
concerns that trial places on the poor.
C. Other Options
When there is unequal access to the criminal justice system, the
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to remove that inequality.
However, America’s federalist system allows state officials to choose
which solutions would work best for their state. Reimbursement and
accessible loans are examples of solutions that use limited resources
and are targeted to fix inequality. However, every state has different
budgets, laws, cultures, and justice systems. State officials should
closely analyze the problems in the criminal justice system in their
state to create a custom-made solution to their unique situation. To
be clear, while no particular solution is necessary, the states must do
something. Exactly what they do is up to their discretion, but until they
do something, the poor will continue to have unequal access to trials.

Conclusion
Because most cases are resolved through plea deals, flaws in the plea
bargaining process threaten many American citizens. These flaws in
the plea bargaining system stem from its unregulated nature, which
gives prosecutors unprecedented power to propose sentences and
coerce defendants to accept those sentences.
Because of plea bargaining, prosecuting attorneys have replaced
judges, juries are irrelevant, and sentences are agreed upon behind
closed doors. Not only have prosecutors replaced the constitutional
framework of a jury trial, but their work is virtually unregulated.
Unlike in trial, prosecutors are not required to present evidence in
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favor of the defendant, even if the evidence proves that the defendant
is innocent. Additionally, in many states, defendants must waive certain constitutional rights before accepting a plea deal, such as the
right to later claim that they had inadequate representation. Although
the character of the plea bargaining system can be coercive for anyone, trial costs and the flawed structure of the bargaining system
make it so that poor defendants have no choice but to plead guilty.
Under this system, poor defendants cannot assert their constitutional
right to trial and are instead forced into a process where they can be
put in prison without sufficient proof of guilt.
Prosecutors have at least two tactics that are especially coercive
for poor people: sending defendants to pretrial detention and using
the trial penalty to instill fear in defendants. Both tactics play off
the fact that poor defendants do not have savings, cannot provide
for their family if they miss working for too long, and cannot afford
childcare for extended periods. Due to these situations, poor defendants cannot afford to go to pretrial detention or get a longer sentence and, therefore, they plead guilty. The flaws in the bargaining
system also keep defendants from going to trial. These flaws include
the costs of trial, poor representation, and the psychological effects
of the system. These factors disproportionately affect people living
in poverty.
The combination of prosecutors’ coercive tactics and flaws in
the bargaining system deprive the poor of their constitutional right
to trial, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Historical precedent
has shown that if people do not have equal access to the criminal
justice system, the state must remedy the inequality. Courts have
left the states to choose the remedy. States can protect defendants’
constitutional right to a trial, rich or poor, by reimbursing innocent
defendants for the costs of asserting their innocence, giving defendants easy access to loans, and more.

